ARAŞTIRMA DOSYASI /// DOD/IG Report : DoD Freedom of Information Act Policies Need Improvement, August 16, 2016

Objective The Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs requested that the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) determine whether noncareer officials (political appointees or persons nominated by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate) were adversely affecting the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) process at the DoD between January 2007 and July 2015. In response, we determined whether DoD noncareer officials unduly influenced the FOIA response process through unnecessary delays or withholding of information that would have otherwise been released absent the noncareer official’s involvement. Finding Our evaluation did not disclose any instances of DoD noncareer officials unduly influencing t he F OIA r esponse p rocess. On November 9, 2015, we advised the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of our evaluation results (see Appendix D). During the course of this evaluation, however, we determined that DoD FOIA policies a re outdated. The DoD Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO) had not updated DoD FOIA policies, as required by DoD Instruction 5025.01, “DoD Issuance Program,” to ensure currency and accuracy. The DoD FOIA policies did not include requirements established in Executive Order 13392, “Improving Agency Disclosure of Information,” and the “OPEN Government Act of 2007.” According to the Executive Order and the Act, agencies must review their FOIA processing operations, report on their FOIA improvement plan implementation, and strengthen procedures related to FOIA administration. Additionally, the DCMO did not incorporate guidance being used for “significant” FOIA releases into DoD Regulation 5400.7-R, “DoD Freedom of Information Act Program.” A “significant” FOIA request is defined as any FOIA request in which the subject matter of the released documents may be of interest to DoD senior leadership, the public, the media, or Congress. Full Report DOD/IG Report: DoD Freedom of Information Act Policies Need Improvement, August 16, 2016 [34 Pages, 3.1MB]

ARAŞTIRMA DOSYASI : Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of lntelligence and Analysis (I&A) Reports

According to the Department of Homeland Security, the following is the Office of lntelligence and Analysis’ mission statement: Background The Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) mission is to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with the intelligence and information it needs to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. I&A’s mission is supported by four strategic goals: Promote Understanding of Threats Through Intelligence Analysis Collect Information and Intelligence Pertinent to Homeland Security Share Information Necessary for Action Manage Intelligence for the Homeland Security Enterprise Analysis Our analysis is guided by our Program of Analysis (POA), an assessment of key analytic issues, framed as key intelligence questions (KIQ). These KIQs are shaped by customer needs, Administration and Departmental leadership priorities, and resources. Our KIQs are organized by time frame. Immediate and Ongoing Threat KIQs focus on short term or operational issues such as imminent terrorist threats to the homeland. Production that addresses these threats provides the Administration and DHS leadership with the intelligence analysis to better inform near-term operational decision to increase the nation’s security. Strategic Context KIQs focus on providing context, trend, or pattern analysis. Production that addresses these KIQs helps our customers understand recent threats in a broader, global, or historical perspective and they shape strategies to combat the threats or address gaps in homeland security. These would include, for example, how the evolving cartel-related violence in Mexico compares to past cartel wars or how threats to our national infrastructure are changing. Opportunity KIQs focus on emerging issues or topics for which reporting streams are new or fragmentary; for example, these KIQs may describe the kinds of polices or activities that have been effective in combating newly emerging threats. As might be expected of an intelligence element supporting a Cabinet-level Department, about half of our KIQs in the POA focus on providing intelligence to respond to the strategic needs of our customers. This is followed by our focus on immediate and ongoing threat. About 10 percent of our focus is on identifying new topics and issues that could impact the Department and its customers. Below you will find records associated with the DHS/I&A and the reports they produce. Document Archive IA-0000-15 Report List Index (2015) [118 Pages, 4.2MB] IA-0000-13 or IA-0000-14 Report List Index (2013-2014) [118 Pages, 10.1MB]

ARAŞTIRMA DOSYASI : Agency Inspector General Reports and Investigations

Background Agencies periodically conduct their own special investigations and produce reports about certain allegations against their respective departments. For example, the CIA Inspector General produced a report regarding the allegations of the connection between the CIA and drug trafficking. Each agency will do the same types of investigations. Below, you will find reports and indexes that are relevant. I decided to compile them here in one archive, as it is interesting to show a complete set of allegations/investigations. Declassified Documents Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Inspector General CIA Inspector General Report of Investigation: Improper Handling of Classified Information by John M. Deutch, February 18, 2000 [84 Pages, 266kb] CIA Inspector General Report of Dumping Hazardous Material into Potomac at CIA HQ, February 2, 2000 [33 Pages, 4.14MB] List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1997 – October 5, 2004 [57 Pages, 15.1MB] List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1994-1997 [26 Pages, 2.49MB] List of CIA Inspections and Special Studies, 1990-1994 [16 Pages, 4.2MB] Department of Commerce Inspector General Department of Commerce Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [17 Pages, 2.3MB] Department of Energy (DOE) Inspector General DOE/IG Investigation into Fisker Automotive, 2012 [32 Pages, 1.96MB] – On 26 March 2012, the DOE was notified about a misuse of funds and questionable business practices by Fisker Automotive. They previously had received DOE Loan Program Office financing. These files are the first release relating to their investigation. National Nuclear Security Administration Nuclear Weapons Systems Configuration Management, March 2014 [30 Pages, 0.8MB] – The Office of Inspector General received multiple allegations regarding the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) management of configuration management (CM) information. The allegations related to incomplete product definitions for NNSA nuclear weapons, and ineffective management of classified nuclear weapons drawings, a situation that could lead to unauthorized changes to the drawings. In response, we initiated this audit to determine whether NNSA had maintained accurate and complete CM information for nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons components to support safe, sound and timely decisions related to these devices. The review substantiated the allegations and identified instances in which NNSA had not maintained accurate and complete CM information for its nuclear weapons and components. DOE/IG Finds 6 BILLION U.S. Dollars MISSING, March 20, 2014 [9 Pages, 1.78MB] – The Office ofInspector General (OIG), in recent audits, investigations, and inspections, has identified significant vulnerabilities in the management of contract file documentation that could expose the Department to substantial financial losses. Specifically, over the past 6 years, OIG has identified Department of State (Department) contracts with a total value of more than $6 billion in which contract files were incomplete or could not be located at all. The failure to maintain contract files adequately creates significant financial risk and demonstrates a lack of internal control over the Department’s contract actions. Department of Interior (DOI) Inspector General DOI/IG Closed Investigation Logs, 2014-2015 [32 Pages, 1.96MB] – Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General April 1, 2009 – September 30, 2009 [87 Pages – 1.87MB] October 1, 2008 – March 31, 2009 [71 Pages – 2.66MB] April 1, 2008 – September 30, 2008 [72 Pages – 2.70MB] October 1, 2007 – March 31, 2008 [56 Pages – 3.5MB] April 1, 2007 – September 30, 2007 [56 Pages – 2.8MB] October 1, 2006 – March 31, 2007 [104 Pages – 2MB] April 1, 2006 – September 30, 2006 [102 Pages – 8.76MB] October 1, 2005 – March 31, 2006 [88 Pages – 413kb] April 1, 2005 to September 30, 2005 [74 Pages – 62MB] October 1, 2004 to March 31, 2005 [60 Pages – 1.32MB] April 1, 2004 to September 30, 2004 [86 Pages – 3.53MB] October 1, 2003 to March 31, 2004 [86 Pages – 3.53MB] April 1, 2003 to September 30, 2003 [62 Pages – 1.24MB] October 1, 2002 to March 31, 2003 [54 Pages – 963kb] Director of National Intelligence Inspector General ODNI OIG Semi-Annual Reports, published in 2013 [98 Pages – 8.82MB] Federal Communications Commission Inspector General FCC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [4 Pages, 0.9MB] Health and Human Services (HHS) Inspector General IG Investigations Closed 2005-2008 [150 Pages – 3.37MB] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) NGA/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [12 Pages – 2.3MB] National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Inspector General IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [6 Pages – 3.5MB] Inspection of the National Reconnaissance Office Declassification Activities, 22 October 2014 [34 Pages – 4.1MB] Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspector General NRC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [6 Pages – 3.5MB] Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) Inspector General SEC/IG Investigations Closed 2014-2015 [2 Pages – 0.5MB] – Still seeking an index that has case names, or summaries, or anything more than what was released here. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) SIGAR/IG Investigations Closed 01/01/2011 – 08/01/2013 [16 Pages – 2.4MB]

ARAŞTIRMA DOSYASI : UFO Reporting Procedures & Regulations

The following documents were discovered by The Black Vault that pertain to reporting UFOs by the U.S. Military, Government and Commercial installations. United States Air Force – Air Force Instruction 10-206 Air Force Instruction 10-206. 2008 Revision with UFO references [87 Pages] – Up until 2011, the Air Force had this publication active, and UFOs remained in it to be reported. When The Huffington Post profiled The Black Vault, and this discovery, the publication was changed within days. Reference: Air Force UFO Rules Vanish After Huffington Post Inquiry. Air Force Instruction 10-206. 2011 Revision without UFO references [40 Pages, 0.4MB] Change log to AFI 10-206 [19 Pages, 0.3MB] United States Air Force – Air Force Regulation 200-2 Air Force Regulation 200-2 [8 Pages, 4.76mb] – This Regulation establishes procedures for information and evidence material pertaining to unidentified flying objects and sets forth the responsibility of Air Force activities in this regard. It applies to all Air Force Activities. United States Air Force – UFOB UFOB – History of the 4602nd Air Intelligence Service Squadron, 1 Jan to 30 June 1955 [74 Pages, 3.76mb] Department of Defense DoD 5040.6-M-1, October 21, 2002, Decision Logic Table Instructions for Recording and Handling Visual Information Material [64 Pages, 0.3 MB] – In this DOD manual, dated 2002 and is still on the books, references what military personnel should do given they take a photograph of a UFO. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) ALL “UFO” References in FAA Manuals / Regulations, 2016 Release [7 Pages, 0.7MB] – In 2016, I requested all manuals and regulations that the FAA had that referenced UFOs. These are the pages I received, which do not amount to anything more than recommendations to submit UFO reports to the National UFO Reporting Center or law enforcement. Joint Army Navy Air Force Publication (JANAP) 146(E) JANAP 146(E) [33 Pages]

MK ULTRA PROJECT : International Committee on Offensive Microwave Weapons on the “NIEHS Working Group Report”

Taken from a statement by
Harlan Girard, Managing Director
International Committee on Offensive Microwave Weapons on the “NIEHS Working Group Report”

National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences
Washington, D.C.
September 28, 1998

My name is Harlan Girard, and I am the Managing Director of the International Committee on Offensive Microwave Weapons, located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. I would like to comment in the broadest way possible on the Working Group Report, rather than specifics, because lurking behind the science of human health effects from exposure to power-line frequency electric and magnetic fields are powerful interests and government programs whose existence has never been publicly acknowledged. Yet they are always present, or re-presented, in debates concerning the science itself and the continued funding of science seeking answers to the questions you have addressed. And their interests are not your own.

In 1982, an obscure organization called the Congressional Clearinghouse on the Future published a study titled “Future Agenda”. The Congress is always focused on problems requiring immediate resolution. The obscure chairman of the Clearinghouse proposed to take a look into the future by polling all the subcommittees in the House of Representatives. He asked them to tell him what they believed would be the burning issues before their subcommittee ten years in the future.

In two places in that report, “Future Agenda”, the words ‘offensive microwave weapons’ are used, and in one place the words ‘offensive microwave weapons’ are linked with the words ‘and mind-control mechanisms.’ I have never seen the words ‘offensive microwave weapons’ used in any other government report. We’ve never had the public discussion of ‘offensive microwave weapons’ which should have occurred by 1992, but these weapons are out there and they are being used on human beings, both experimentally and operationally.

Because of my interest in the technology of ‘offensive microwave weapons’, I am frequently contacted by people who believe they are being assaulted (and mind-controlled) with microwave weapons by the United States Government. Since 1990 I have spent countless hours listening to these people and attempting to separate truth from delusion, to separate the credible cases of involuntary human experimentation from people who “wanna be” victims of government research.

In 1991, I had a long conversation about the problem of ‘mind-control mechanisms’ with W. Ross Adey. He counseled me to forget these victims because the Central Intelligence Agency would soon lose interest in electric and magnetic field effects and go onto something else. The outcome has been quite the opposite of what he expected, and in recent years the reports crossing my desk (and tying up my telephone) have accelerated greatly. Not only that, but new words are entering the vocabulary of the military and intelligence establishments: biological process control, cognitive warfare, synthetic telepathy, information operations, beta wave incapacitators and psycho-technologies.

Now I took the words ‘offensive microwave weapons’ as the name of my public interest advocacy group because the obscure Chairman of the Congressional Clearinghouse on the Future in 1982 is a very prominent man in 1998. His name is Albert Gore, Jr. (Vice President of the United States of America). So we know that at the highest level of government discussions have been held about ‘offensive microwave weapons’ and ‘mind-control mechanisms’.

My point is this: how can the United States Government endorse and fund and act on the health effects from exposure to electric and magnetic fields at the same time as it is weaponizing the biological effects and health effects of those very same fields? What interest does the United States have, particularly in health effects, when human beings are being involuntarily exposed to enormous amounts of radiation in a Manhattan-type project to unlock the secrets of the human mind and consciousness?

The biological and health effects of human exposure to electric and magnetic fields of every frequency are already well known to the military and intelligence establishments. They are being weaponized. I urge you to join me in asking that those Special Access Programs in which such involuntary human experimentation takes place be opened, for the health and well being of all mankind.

ERMENİ SORUNU DOSYASI : Declassified CIA Report About Armenian Terrorism

Declassified CIA Report About Armenian Terrorism.pdf

ARAŞTIRMA DOSYASI : Cold War Era – Reports & Records

The following are uncategorized documents from the Cold War era. They are listed on this page until they are properly categorized. Acquisition Management in the U.S. Air Force and Its Predecessors, 1997 [66 Pages] Air Combat Command (ACC) and the Legacy of the Cold War, December 1995 [3,228 Pages, 124.91MB] – The end of the Cold War in 1989 brought with it a restructuring of the Department of Defense. The ACC came into existence on June 1, 1992, incorporating assets from the Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), and Military Airlift Command (MAC). During the Cold War, SAC and TAC had the primary responsibility of enforcing United States policies around the world through the deployment of air power, especially to contain and deter communism. Air Defense Command (ADC; renamed Aerospace Defense Command in 1968) and SAC had the primary responsibility for deterrence and air defense of the continental United States; TAC supported this mission. The bulk of the USAF ACC real property holdings are related to SAC, ADC, and TAC activities. Although the USAF missile program was transferred to the United States Space Command, under the operational authority of the North American Aerospace Defense Command in July 1993, the missile fields remain under the administration of ACC through the individual bases. The Crowded Path to Unlimited Soviet Arsenals, September 21, 1994 [ 157 Pages, 4.89MB ] – What Soviet Party Leaders, General Staff, and Industrialists Thought They Were Doing in the Cold War. This volume contains much of the raw material on which this study is based. All items in this collection represent the testimony, in some form, of Soviet and American strategic planners and analysts whose professional careers were largely dominated by the need to understand and respond effectively to the military threat from their Cold War opponents. Richard Helms as Director of the CIA, 1993 [ 229 Pages ] Talking Points for the DCI, January, 1990 – Current Soviet Troop Strengths in Afghanistan. Eastern Europe on the Eve of the Malta Meeting, November 29, 1989 VOX Topic Article, Volume 32, Fall 1989 [40 Pages, 10.7 MB] United Loans to the Soviet Bloc, September 16. 1988 Soviet Acknowledgement of Budget Deficit, October 23, 1988 FBI File: FBI File 65-HQ-30092 [262 Pages, 15.8MB] – Released FBI File 65-HQ-30092 Telephone Bugging of Russian Embassy in 1940 Also mentions telephone bugging of the Embassies of Germany, Italy, France, and Japan. The Gorbachev Era: Implication for U.S. Strategy — Speech by Robert Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency, October 14, 1988 Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, August 23, 1974 Tactics (The Officer’s Library), 1966 [279 Pages, 26.2MB] – This book outlines the basic questions of the ground tactics of combined-arms combat in a missile and nuclear war. It presents the subject of tactics and its place and role in the military art and indicates the material basis of modern combined-arms combat, its character, and the most important principles of conducting it. Basic attention is allotted to the discussion of the content of offensive, encounter, and defensive combat. Status of AID Project, as of 30 June 1964 [43 Pages, 5.10mb] – Document listing different periodicals and reference aids from the Soviet Union. Interesting titles. Still unclear where this intelligence might be. Stranger than Fiction. Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters, January 1990 [86 Pages, 4.3mb] – The Soviets have conducted submarine operations in Swedish waters continuously since World War II. Although the evidence of these violations of Sweden’s territorial waters is incomplete, Swedish authorities indicate that submarine operations were carried out infrequently and at irregular intervals during the 1960s and into the late 1970s.