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Mutazioni e permanenze nella storia navale del Mediterraneo

La storia navale del Mediterraneo tra la fine del Cinquecento e il XVIII secolo è considerata come una fase di inesorabile decadenza dell'area dopo gli exploits basso medievali e cinquecenteschi. Se la storiografia più recente ha cominciato a rivisitare questa tradizione negativa con un occhio meno sconcolato e più attento alle effettive dinamiche che andavano maturando tra Gibilterra e i Dardanelli, questa rielaborazione ha investito solo l'ambito più generale della storia marittima e commerciale, e in parte anche quella economica, senza invece toccare gli aspetti più propriamente navali. Sotto questo profilo, il Mediterraneo rimane ancor oggi il regno esclusivo della galea, considerata la migliore dimostrazione, "la prova provata" dell'incapacità di un ambiente tecnologicamente retrogrado e oscurantista di evolversi in un mondo dominato dal vascello. Una visione antiquata che i saggi contenuti in questo volume rielaborano alla luce di nuove interpretazioni.

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MUTAZIONI E PERMANENZE NELLA STORIA NAVALE DEL MEDITERRANEO

G. CANDIANI, L. LO BASSO (a cura di)



Guerra e pace in età moderna

Annali di storia militare europea

2

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secc. XVI-XIX

a cura di

Guido Candiani, Luca Lo Basso

FRANCOANGELI

Guerra e pace in età moderna. Annali di storia militare europea

Gli Annali si pongono l'obiettivo di colmare, in ambito italiano, l'assenza di una sede specificamente dedicata a studi di carattere storico-militare, inteso nel suo senso più ampio, in relazione ai secoli dell'età moderna (XV-XIX). Nelle intenzioni del Comitato scientifico vi è, inoltre, la speranza di coinvolgere stabilmente studiosi italiani e stranieri, in modo tale da creare un terreno di continuo scambio e discussione. Dal confronto infatti del panorama storiografico italiano con quello straniero emerge l'assenza di indagini centrate su prospettive nazionali o regionali comparabili con le ricerche condotte sui casi tedesco, olandese, francese, austriaco, britannico o spagnolo. Esistono certamente molti studi meritevoli di grande attenzione, ma sono mancate le indagini volte a ricostruire la presenza italiana nelle varie guerre europee e la partecipazione dei diversi Stati italiani alle grandi conferenze diplomatiche dell'età moderna.

Come indica il titolo, la storia militare sarà intesa anche dal punto di vista politico, economico e sociale, con un taglio cioè di tipo interdisciplinare, accogliendo i contributi di specialisti che si dedicano sia alle tematiche storico-militari sia allo scenario internazionale occupato sempre più spesso dalla costruzione di una pace stabile e duratura.

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Introduzione – Mutazioni e permanenze nella storia navale del Mediterraneo (secc. XVI-XIX)

Guido Candiani*, Luca Lo Basso**

Il secondo volume della serie *Guerra e Pace. Annali di storia militare europea* affronta il tema della storia navale del Mediterraneo in età moderna. Usando l'espressione storia navale, si è voluto porre qui l'accento sugli aspetti più propriamente militari delle vicende marittime del Mediterraneo, lasciando sullo sfondo i temi più classici della guerra di corsa o dei rapporti commerciali, già ampiamente dibattuti in campo storiografico. Solitamente la maggior parte del periodo preso in esame è considerato come una fase di inesorabile decadenza dell'area mediterranea dopo gli *exploits* basso medievali e cinquecenteschi¹, per quanto già negli anni Cinquanta Fernand Braudel avesse messo in evidenza la continua vivacità del mare interno almeno fino alla metà del Seicento². Se la storiografia più recente ha cominciato a rivisitare questa tradizione negativa con un occhio meno sconcolato e più attento alle effettive dinamiche che andavano maturando tra Gibilterra e i Dardanelli³, questa rielaborazione ha investito solo l'ambito più generale della storia marittima e commerciale, e in parte anche quella economica, senza invece toccare la storia più propriamente navale. Sotto il profilo della storia navale, il Mediterraneo rimane ancor oggi il regno esclusivo della galea, considerata la migliore dimostrazione «la prova provata» dell'incapacità di un ambiente tecnologicamente retrogrado e oscurantista di evolversi in un mondo domina-

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¹ La bibliografia che insiste sulla decadenza del Mediterraneo e sulla superiorità tecnica e commerciale dei nordici è sterminata. Una recente messa a punto in lingua italiana è quella di M. Fusaro, *Reti commerciali e traffici globali in età moderna*, Roma-Bari, 2008.

² F. Braudel, *Note sull'economia del Mediterraneo nel XVII secolo*, in «Economia e Storia», 2 (1955), pp. 117-142.

³ Cfr. ad esempio M. Greene, *Beyond the Northern Invasion: the Mediterranean in the Seventeenth Century*, in «Past and Present», 174 (2002), pp. 42-71.

sottile per sostenerne l'azione, anche le galeazze conobbero il loro momento migliore durante la guerra di Candia, ma quando i nuovi vascelli di linea furono in grado di imbarcare un numero molto maggiore di cannoni altrettanto pesanti e quando essi furono adottati dalla nuova marina velica ottomana, il loro destino apparve segnato. Entro la fine del secolo, le galeazze erano uscite definitivamente dalla squadra da battaglia veneziana, sebbene un paio rimanessero in servizio fino alla metà del Settecento per motivi più che altro amministrativo e di prestigio¹⁵⁷. Se proprio si volesse cercare un anacronismo nella marina veneziana, esso andrebbe trovato non nella permanenza delle galee, ma in quella delle galeazze, celebrato orgoglio della cantieristica lagunare¹⁵⁸.

1980, p. 32) ma queste grandi unità erano in grado di operare solo vicino alle proprie basi nazionali. Le navi che agivano nel Mediterraneo erano invece mercantili armate che, per quanto poderosi, imbarcavano pezzi di calibro inferiore, solitamente, come detto, non superiori a dei 12 pdr. Ciò era anche dovuto al fatto che esse avevano quasi sempre cannoni in ferro, più economici ma di peso maggiore rispetto a quelli di bronzo del medesimo calibro; inoltre i cannoni di ferro andavano maggiormente soggetti al riscaldamento e dovevano essere raffreddati più spesso, rallentando la rapidità del tiro in un'eventuale battaglia.

¹⁵⁷ Le due galeazze erano considerate una fucina di addestramento per rematori e marinai nel caso si decidesse un loro futuro riarmo.

¹⁵⁸ Va peraltro osservato, a conferma di quanto possano essere relative le valutazioni sull'evoluzione della tecnologia navale, che negli anni 1690', proprio quando le galeazze veneziane entravano definitivamente in crisi, in Inghilterra si propose di abbandonare la costruzione dei vascelli di linea a favore di quella delle galeazze. B. Lavery, *The Ship of the Line*, I, London, 1984, p. 59.

Reform of the Ottoman Navy and Ottoman Superiority at Sea (1701-1718)

Yusuf Alperen Aydin*

Having owned a long coastline along the Mediterranean and inherited the legacy of this geography, the Ottomans used to employ oar-driven crafts at their fleets as a consequence. They won important naval battles thanks to the ships propelled by oars, gained supremacy on the Mediterranean in the 16th century. Losing this supremacy at the sea since the second half of the 17th century drove the Ottomans to seriously think over their own naval policy and the conditions necessary for the transformation from oar-driven ships (galleys) to sail-driven ships (galleons) began to come into existence¹.

Disastrous defeats both on the land and at the sea inflicted by its adversaries in the second half of the 17th century brought about a series of military reforms in the Ottoman army and navy in the subsequent century. The first military reformation attempt noticed at the very beginning of the 18th century was that of the restructure in the navy. Thus, the main power of the Ottoman navy was going to consist of not the galleys but the galleons whose number set to reach forty. Not long after the first quarter of the century passed, triumphs² in the two battles fought respectively in 1717 and 1718 against Venice at the Cape Matapan, which is situated on the Peloponnesian Peninsula, proved the success of the recent restructures in the fleet. Treaty of Passarowitz (1130/1718) was a direct outcome of the Ottoman success at the seas³.

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¹ İ. Bostan, *17. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Osmanlı Gemi Teknolojisinin Değişimi: Kadırgadan Kalyona*, in *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, İstanbul, 2007², pp. 183-206.

² H. Pemsel, *Weltgeschichte der Seefahrt, Band 6, Seeherrschaft II, Seekriege und Seepolitik von 1650 bis 1914*, Wien, 2005, pp. 618-620.

³ A.H. De Groot, *The Ottoman Mediterranean Since Lepanto (October 7th, 1571): Naval Warfare During the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, in Idem, *The Netherlands and*

Taking the Ottoman Armada's successive defeats against the Venice during the siege of Crete at the second half of the 17th century into consideration, its decisive victories against the Venetian Armada in the beginnings of the next century are highly remarkable. As a result of those naval battles which politically bolstered Ottoman demands vis-à-vis Venice and yielded a diplomatic victory, the newly designed Ottoman fleet must be the focal point. Therefore, it will be much more appreciable to investigate the implementations carried out through the re-organisation of the Ottoman fleet in the very beginnings of the 18th century.

This paper focuses on the production of sailcloth and anchor which were the two most important equipments of the galleons that ought to be the subject of the change and transformation in the fleet from the Code of Navigation of 1701 (*Bahriye Kanunnamesi*) to the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718. Moreover, probably more importantly there exists such regulations that illustrates the determinedly support of the empire to the reform of the Ottoman navy. Those regulations clearly show that the central administration right after the Code of Navigation of 1701 kept an eye on the navy and took the necessary precautions in order to cope with the emerging difficulties and needs.

1. The Navigation Code of 1701 and the other Regulations

The Navigation Code of 1701 was prepared to implement a great reform on the Ottoman fleet. Thus, it targeted the basic elements of the naval force, i.e. ship and sailors. The text pertaining to the Navigation Code, prepared by Mezomorta Hüseyin Paşa⁴ but came into effect after his death, is available at three different places. One of the existing two textual materials in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives is placed in a Muhimme register numbered 112⁵, and the other one is in a different *defter* numbered 14599 in

Turkey: *Four Hundred Years of Political, Economical, Social and Cultural Relations, Selected Essays*, Istanbul, 2007, pp. 173-174.

⁴ About Hüseyin Paşa, see İ. Bostan, *Mezemorta Hüseyin Paşa*, in *Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. XXIX, Istanbul, 2005, pp. 524-526.

⁵ Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), *Mühimme Defteri (MD)* 112, pp. 18-23. For the text of Kanunnâme, see İ.H. Uzunçarşılı *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahriye Teşkilâtı*, Ankara, 1988, pp. 523-527. Other studies inspecting the Kanunnâme see İ. Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı: XVII. Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire*, Ankara 1992, p. 184; *ibid*, *Osmanlı Gemileri*, p. 137.

the catalogue of *Başmuhasebe Tersane Emaneti*⁶. The third one is mentioned in an anonymous Ottoman chronicle⁷.

At the preliminary to the main part of the Code (*Kanunname*) before the explanation of the undertaken reforms, it is ordered that from this date onward, the regulations this code arranged be complied and not to be breached. The *Kanunname* initially emphasises that the number of galleons in the Ottoman fleet must be increased to forty promptly, and thereafter the galleon construction should not be neglected, yearly replacing the rotten and obsolete galleons with brand new ones. Besides, it reveals in the Code that fine timber from the districts attached as *ocaklık* (A system where the taxpayers of a certain judicial district were obliged to pay their tax by means of supplying given materials to the state) to the Imperial Naval Arsenal (*Tersâne-i Amire*) was to be brought and used in the reconstruction of obsolete galleons, thus, building one or two new galleons per year, expanding the number of galleons⁸.

Accordingly, galleons; crafts with sails and high freeboard, and their relatives were to make up the fighting force of the Ottoman fleet since 1701. The time of galleys propelled by oars was over. However, naval commanders (*umera-i derya*), representing the Ottoman Empire's military strength in the Aegean Sea, continued to employ oar ships.

In the *Kanunname*, there was such an approach related to the administrative structure of the State that proposed a serious reform about the sailors, another important element of the sea power. It was definitely prohibited in the *Kanunname* that hereafter any general from land forces to be promoted to the place of Grand Admiral (Kaptan Paşa). The *Kanunname* banned unfair dismissal of the grand admirals, but rather allowed them to continue their job during their lives unless they committed any crime requiring discharge. Upon their dismissal or death, captain of the Imperial admiral's ship (*kapudâne-i hümayûn*) was to be upgraded as grand admiral. The captain of vice-admiral's flagship (*Patrona*) was to be elevated as the captain of *kapudâne-i hümayûn*, conditioned solely on his loyalty and seafaring wisdom and experience, and captain of the rear admiral's ship (*Ri-yâle*) to be assigned to the former position. The captains of the galleons

⁶ There is not prevailed the *hatt-ı hümayûn* part in the copy of the Kanunnâme: BOA, D. BŞM. TRE def. 14599, pp. 1-9.

⁷ *Osmanlı Tarihi (1099-1116/1688-1704)*, yay. haz. A. Özcan, Ankara, 2000, pp. 167-171.

⁸ There were 27 galleons, two of which were being constructed at the time when the Kanunnâme was completed. One of the two galleons being currently constructed was 62,5 zirâ in length (47,37 m.) with three decks and the other was a galleon of 43 zirâ (32,59 m.) that had begun to be built by the timbers left from construction of the former galleon.

were going to confer and elect the most eligible one amongst themselves for captain of Riyâle. The prerequisite of this election was not to be seniority, but rather competency. Finally, captain chosen as the Grand Admiral throughout the process of electing competent officers was going to be appointed to this rank as an able-person to sail and conduct the fleet he was entrusted with.

In the case of death or discharge of one of the captains of the galleons, First chief admiral (*baş reis*) of the galleon known as capitana (*kapudâne*) was to be moved as captain to this galleon. Vacancy for the position of First chief admiral, then, was to be filled by appointing someone proficient and knowledgeable from between the *aylakciyân* (a low-ranked official in a ship) in the *kapudâne* or from the other galleons. When there was an opening in the position of Chief Cannoneer, steward, (*kethüda*) of the cannoners was going to be nominated to this position, and the most senior and suitable one to be charged as steward. When the posts of highly-paid officers fell vacant, only ones who had professional experience and capacity was to be preferred for the appointments to those posts, unfair appointment by intervention of influential persons was certainly not allowed. Especially, it was asked not to employ anyone uninterested in seafaring.

Neither the Grand Admiral nor the captains was to lessen personnel number of galleons for any purpose whatsoever, and the certain number of personnel as well as ammunition allocated to each galleon was to be arranged with no omission. Those who had wounded at a war were going to make possible to get retired with a pension.

The Navigation Code lucidly regulated appointment, promotion and retirement conditions of the Ottoman navy personnel. It is understood that Mezemorta Hüseyin Pasha as a seaman trained in the Barbary States (*Garp Ocakları*) had an impact on these regulations. Especially the fact that nomination of new captains was going to be through an election among the captains of galleons themselves must be evaluated as a reflection of practice of making mutual decision by privateer captains in Barbary States.

The Kanunname of 1701 dealt with some basic issues of Ottoman navigation, yet new regulations when needed will gradually be carried out.

2. The Regulations of 1706-1707

When five years had elapsed over the Navigation Code of 1701, there appeared a need for some new implementations on certain subjects. These regulations dated to 28 August, 1706 mainly focused on three matters as followings: *Levend* (Marine Soldier) roll call, recording of the equipments

and ammunitions allocated to the galleons, and repair of galleons upon necessary examinations⁹.

It is apparent that this regulation was designed to identify the problems which had occurred after the advent of galleon in Ottoman navy. The existence of another regulation, prepared roughly six months later, arranging every aspect of works concerning Imperial Naval Arsenal and galleon precisely illustrates continuity of the keen interest of responsible bodies in the navy. The regulation of 28 August 1706 had only stated that someone reliable was to be employed to list equipments and ammunitions, it can be noticed that the regulation of 14 January 1707 introduced a new officer called harbour master (*Liman Reisi*) for that job¹⁰.

Harbour master was entrusted with the two essential tasks to (1) properly distribute the salaries and to (2) allocate adequate ammunitions, provisions and supplies to the galleons going on an expedition and then to collect and store them following the return of the fleet. He would be granted both the rank of captain of *Patrona* in order to enjoy a concession over the captains of galleons and the other workers in the Imperial Naval Arsenal and an annual salary of 250.000 fine akçe for his living expenses. Furthermore, a registrar with an annual salary of 60.000 akçe was to be appointed to record all the proceedings related to the galleons under the control of *Liman Reisi*. These two officers were not going to be discharges as long as they served honestly and diligently¹¹.

This regulation also set the rules to be complied by a galleon from the beginning till the end of an expedition as well as from the construction and repair to the caulking of a galleon.

3. The Regulation of 1714

The regulation of 1707 had introduced terms concerning the order of the Imperial Naval Arsenal and its personnel. The recent regulation of 4 March, 1714 was prepared to revise the responsibilities and positions of the officers in the galleons, namely captains, galleon hocası, *vekil-i harc* (an officer who was in charge of superintending all the galleon's expenses), the

⁹ BOA, *Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler (MAD)* 3142, p. 83.

¹⁰ BOA, *MAD* 3142, p. 86.

¹¹ Upon the petition (*arz*) dated 22 April, 1707 of Hacı İbrahim Pasha, the Grand Admiral, Süleyman Kaptan (Captain) was the first *Liman reisi* to be appointed and Ömer was the first registrar. Their *berats* (i.e. appointment certificates) were granted in 2 June, 1707 (BOA, *MAD* 8880, p. 88).

chief admiral, *yelkenci* and chief gunner¹². The five prominent persons in the crew of each galleon, who were knowledgeable about maritime and able to conduct the correspondence, were respectively employed as galleon *hocası*, *vekil-i harc*, chief admiral, *yelkenci*, and chief gunner. They were never going to leave their workplaces and were never going to be dismissed providing that they were working diligently and with great care.

These five officers had been given the responsibility for the accurately use and the prevention of unnecessary consumption and wastage of ammunitions and supplies allocated to the galleons going on the campaign. They were also responsible for the checking of the said equipments in the galleons on their return. In practice, as captains of galleons used to appoint these five officers between the sailors loyal to themselves, upon their dismissals or re-appointment to another galleon they used to take away these permanently appointed five officers in their retinue. Subsequently, the newly-assigned captain would appoint persons within his retinue to the concerned positions; the new appointees naturally would have no information on the supplies, ammunitions, *levend* roll call and the remaining matters. This practice especially caused monetarily huge loses.

In order to prevent this damage, hereafter those five officers were to be picked out from the old galleon personnel and occupy the permanent positions (*gedik*) which most suit to them to perfectly fulfill their responsibilities. Unless abused their positions, or passed away, they were going to serve on the same galleons.

4. The Manufacture of Sailcloth

In 1701, the Grand Admiral Abdülfettah Pasha (1701-2) was ordered to consult with the French merchant about the sailcloth needed for the two galleons and deliver the result after his statement that the sailcloth that the two big galleons being constructed at the Imperial Dockyard requiring could be brought from France¹³. After the negotiations Abdülfettah Pasha reported that the French merchant had expressed that since the said equipment should be bought from the French government, they would only be exchangeable for *gomina wire*¹⁴ but not money. Thereupon, the import of

¹² BOA, MAD 3171, fol. 64b.

¹³ The *emr-i şerif* (imperial rescript) to the Grand Admiral Abdülfettah Pasha of 14 December 1701 (BOA, MAD 4875, p. 65); MAD 9889, p. 327, h. 2 (13 B. 1113/14 December 1701).

¹⁴ Gomina was the name given to the heavy rope to which anchor is fastened. Wire indicates the threads woven from hemp. The heavy rope, gomina, is fabricated by weaving the threads.

the sailcloth from France was cancelled, and the procurement of cloth from Boğaz hisarları (Gallipoli) which was noticed to be of excellent quality, instead, was decided¹⁵.

For a while sailcloth had been supplied from Gallipoli, however, the unsafe climate culminated from such reasons as its remote distance to Istanbul and absence of institution of adequate supervision led the state to manufacture the sailcloth in Istanbul. As a consequence of the desire to manufacture by its own means to meet the state galleons' demand for sailcloth, the *Kir-pâs* Manufactory (Cloth Mill), established over the field of the old dockyard had initially pursued a demand production policy which later on time shifted into an annual production policy¹⁶.

The advent of galleon certainly increased the demand for some materials. Among those materials sailcloth ranked in the first place. Having smoothly manufactured such materials using its own means, Ottomans preferred to meet the sailcloth demand in two ways: the first one, as before, was to purchase the sailcloth from the market. The second one was to carry out the manufacture of sailcloth at a state-owned enterprise.

The cloth mill situated on a hill within the area surrounded by the Imperial Naval Arsenal, nearby the old dockyard, bore the features of an enterprise to produce for the meeting the demand of the Imperial navy. It was decided that the enterprise would encompass forty weaving looms. It was planned to annually manufacture 8000 bolts of cloth of which a bolt weighed 1000 *dirhem*¹⁷ and 4000 bolts of cloths of which a bolt weighed 800 dirhem. Accordingly, the quantities and costs of needed raw material of warp and weft¹⁸ as well as wages for workers to be employed had been counted. Thus, a total 12.000 bolts of cloth to be manufactured in the enterprise would cost 2.092.000 akçe (17.433 piasters and 40 akçe)¹⁹.

¹⁵ The *emr-i şerif* to the Grand Admiral Abdülfettah Pasha of 24 February 1702 (BOA, MAD 4875, p. 65); MAD 9889, p. 453, h. 2 (26 N. 1113/24 February 1702). Sailcloth woven in Gallipoli bore the same quality as that of Europe (İ. Bostan, *Tersâne-i Âmiri*, cit., p. 159).

¹⁶ For a study analysing the sailcloth fabricated at the cloth mill established in the Dockyard see, M. Genç, 18. *Yüzyılda Osmanlı Sanayii*, in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi*, İstanbul, 2000, pp. 248-254.

¹⁷ A dirhem is accepted to be equivalent of 3,124 gr. See W. Hinz, *İslam'da Ölçü Sistemleri*, trans. A. Sevim, İstanbul, 1990, p. 4.

¹⁸ The yarn woven in a loom through or approximately vertical fibres known as warp (*eriş*), and horizontal known as weft (*argaç*).

¹⁹ BOA, MAD 2485, p. 142.

Depending on the record kept at the time when Ahmed *Usta* (Craftsman) had delivered the outputs to *kurşunlu mahzen*²⁰, the first production of cloth mill took place between 17 July 1709 and 21 April 1710. According to the information therein, from a total of 10.722,5 kıyye cotton yarn (13.810,34 kg.) of which 6599,5 were weft and 4123 were wrap, produced 4123 bolts of sailcloth, of which each bolt measured 15 *zirâ* (9,75 m.) in length and 1040 *dirhem* (3335,28 gr.) in weight²¹.

Table 1 - Amount of sailcloth delivered between the years 1709-1718

Year	Sailcloth (bolt)
1709	4.123
1710	1.365,5
1711	1.320
1712	2.381
1714	4.938
1715	9.834
1716	10.137
1717	14.012
1718	12.380
Total	60.490,5

Source - BOA, MAD 2485, p. 113, p. 143, p. 161; MAD 2381, fol. 67a; MAD 3171, fol. 52a-b; MAD 2850, p. 96, p. 119; MAD 6266, pp. 138, 146, 166; MAD 2864, fol. 79b; MAD 3918, fol. 155.

5. The Production Figure after the Introduction of Annual Production Rate to the Cloth Mill

The production rate of sailcloth was apparently adjusted to answer the sailcloth requirements of the squadron taking part in the Prut and Morea wars which had broken out just after the foundation of cloth mill. Consequently, daily production rate was arranged as 40 bolts and annual production as 14.160 bolts. However, stressing out that there was no need for such amount of sailcloth production after the end of Morea war in 1718, it was decided that an annual production rate of 2000 bolts of sailcloth was sufficient, which a bolt was to consist of cotton warp yarn of 455 *dirhem* and cotton weft yarn of 565 *dirhem* and to measure 1020 *dirhem* in weight and

²⁰ There were, at the time, two depots (mahzen) in the dockyard. One called *Kereste* (wood) *mahzeni* in which, as can be grasped, wooden equipments were kept, the other one called *Kurşunlu mahzen* in which the rest of the items in the dockyard were kept.

²¹ BOA, MAD 2485, p. 143.

15 *zirâ* in length. 4253,5 piasters was allocated from the custom revenues singled out as *ocaklık*²².

6. Construction of Large Anchors Fitting to Galleons

Ottomans had various options for the procurement of galleon anchors. Large anchors were at first imported from France, later, were constructed at the workshops established within the dockyard. Approximately at the same time galleon anchor was ordered to private ironsmiths at Galata.

Owing to unavailability of the anchors suitable to great – *kebîr* – galleon in Istanbul and other districts together with impossibility of its construction, procurement of them from France had become high in the agenda. Grand Admiral Abdülfettah Pasha had negotiations with a French merchant on the estimation of numbers and weights of anchors a great galleon and three decked galleon would probably need. It was concluded that total six anchors were needed for *kebir* galleon. Two anchors each weighs 50 *kantar* (2822,5 kg.) to be installed at the stem, two anchors each weighs 45 *kantar* (2540,20 kg.) at *sugunda*²³, and two anchors of each weighs 40 *kantar* (2257,96 kg.) to be used for anchoring at ports. For the three-decked galleon, four anchors were demanded, in which two anchors, each weighs 45 *kantar*, to be installed at the stem and two anchors, each weighs 40 *kantar*, to be located at the stern.

Grant Admiral Abdülfettah Pasha reported that apart from the anchors, procurement of sailcloth for these two galleons from France would also be beneficial, and then he was commissioned to negotiate with the French merchant on the aforementioned anchors and sailcloth procurement²⁴.

Some time later Abdülfettah Pasha reported back about the result of the negotiations that the merchant had responded only if gomina wire was to be offered to French government in return for the desired equipments, the trade could be realised. The import of the sailcloth from France was cancelled, and the procurement of cloth from Gallipoli, which was noticed to be of excellent quality, instead was decided. Nevertheless, Abdülfettah Pa-

²² BOA, MAD 10309, p. 155.

²³ *Lingua Franca*, does not include this word, yet, it can be inferred that this word refers to the stern of the galleon because it was mentioned following the expression “stem anchor” (see H. Kahane - A. Tietze, *The Lingua Franca in the Levant*, Istanbul, 1988).

²⁴ The *emr-i şerif* to the Grand Admiral Abdülfettah Pasha of 14 December 1701: BOA, MAD 4875, p. 65; MAD 9889, p. 327, clause 2.

sha was told to ascertain a price for the said anchors and notify the amount of the wire to be exchanged²⁵.

Whereas there has been found no register confirming the deliverance of such anchors, some information in a document belonging to a couple of years later about the order and deliverance of three *anchors* (çapa demiri) is available. This 130 kantar (7338,37 kg)²⁶ weighed anchors cost a sum of 1670,5 piasters of which 151 piasters spent on miscellaneous expenses. It has been calculated that a *kantar* of iron cost 1542 *akçe* (12 piasters and 102 *akçe*)²⁷.

Furthermore, the French envoy was instructed an order of eight anchors, each 50 kantar (2822,45 kg.) in weight and twelve anchors, each 45 kantar (2540,20 kg.) in weight. France seems to have had an important place in the procurement of anchors needed by the Ottoman galleons. Five years later, as a matter of fact, a great number of anchors used or brand new were purchased from France.

The anchors transported from France on board two galleons were delivered to the *Kurşunlu Mahzen* in the last month of 1121 and in the first month of 1122. Of 40 anchors made up of 25 new and 15 old anchors were paid 1600 *akçe* (13 piasters and 40 *akçe*) per kantar in accordance with the earlier deal emphasized to have struck by Superintendent of Imperial Dockyard (*Tersane Emini*). Thus, 58 *akçe* was overpaid by per kantar than the previously imported anchors. Of the 40 anchors, the smallest in weight was 33 kantar 50 lodra and the heaviest was 46 kantar 60 lodra²⁸.

Although it is written in the History of Raşid that large anchors was purchased from England owing to the reason that they could not be constructed in Istanbul²⁹, in the archival documents only the information about the anchors imported from France has been confronted.

In 1702, a couple of months later after negotiating with the French merchant on anchors, on his statement that it was possible to construct *strong* and *firm* anchors at the dockyard for newly built galleons, which comprised of two flukes with a total weight of 50 kantar, a fluke on each side of the

²⁵ The *emr-i şerif* to the Grand Admiral Abdülfettah Pasha of 24 February 1702: BOA, MAD 4875, p. 65; MAD 9889, p. 453, clause 2.

²⁶ The document records that the weight of anchor measured 144,5 kantar 5 lodra by French kantar.

²⁷ Entry of *tezkire* (note) dated 5 March 1705, which was issued for the payment of 1670,5 piasters as the cost of the three anchors, and the *hüküm* (decree) of the same date for the procurement of anchor and sailcloth: BOA, MAD 3141, p. 88.

²⁸ *Tezkires* dated to 17 Z. 1121/17 February 1710, 25 Z. 1121/25 February 1710, and 8 M. 1122/9 March 1710: BOA, MAD 2485, pp. 156-7.

²⁹ Raşid Mehmed Efendi, *Tarih*, İstanbul, 1282, III, 258.

stock weigh 25 kantar, Grand Admiral Abdülfettah Pasha was instructed to immediately have those anchors prepared³⁰. His resolution after the negotiations with the French dealer is very noteworthy to show that there was the inclination for the domestically construction of the anchors, which galleons required, without foreign aid.

It seems likely to mention about influence of both the military and economic considerations that this inclination was formed³¹. Nevertheless, the large anchors the galleons needed could, for the first time, be constructed at the dockyard in the year of 1708. Mehmed Aga, the Chief Bombardier, was given 250 piasters cash in the first month of 1708 to afford the expenses for the construction of galleon anchors³². An order in the second month of 1708 that shanks, flukes, and the other components in three sizes, i.e. *small*, *medium* and *large* to be prepared, which anchors of 30 (1693,47 kg.), 40 (2257,96 kg.), 45 (2540,20 kg.), and 50 (2822,45 kg.) kantar in weight needed, was issued. These components were going to be constructed as sample at the iron mines (*samakos*) in Etrebolu and components sent to the dockyard, henceforth, appropriately prepared³³. Ali *Usta* (Craftsman) was commissioned out to construct these components and qualified 30 piasters as per diem³⁴. In the third month of the year 1708, Mehmed Aga, the Chief Bombardier, constructed the galleon anchor that he had promised to do so. It was recorded to weigh 41,5 kantar 30 lodra (2359,5 kg.). This anchor cost the state 78.240 *akçe*. Thus, a kantar of it has been calculated as 1885 *akçe* (15,5 piasters and 25 *akçe*). Additionally, it was recorded that the state indebted 126 piasters and 40 *kuruş* to the Chief bombardier Mehmed Aga.

If one recalls the fact that French dealer was paid 1600 *akçe* (13 piasters and 40 *akçe*) per kantar in purchase of the latest anchor, the domestic production seems to have been more expensive. Although it had been decided to pay Mehmed Aga a sum of 200 piasters in cash for the construction of new anchors, it was highlighted that henceforth twelve piasters (1440 *akçe*) per kantar to be paid by the state and Mehmed Aga consented this. It was also found appropriate that iron needed for the construction was to be supplied from pig iron available at the dockyard and scrap anchors³⁵.

³⁰ BOA, MAD 4875, p. 70 (14 Za. 1113/12 April 1702).

³¹ W. Müller-Wiener, *Bildlexikon zur Topographie Istanbul: Byzantion, Konstantinoplis, Istanbul bis zum Beginn d. 17. jähre*, Tübingen, 1977, p. 66.

³² The entry of *tezkire* dated to 17 M. 1120/8 April 1708: BOA, MAD 2489, p. 72.

³³ *Hüküm* (decree) corresponded to Mustafa who was entrusted with the duty of purchase of iron from Etrebolu in 27 S. 1120/18 May 1708: BOA, MAD 2489, p. 74.

³⁴ The entry of *Tezkire* dated to 29 Ra. 1120/18 June 1708: BOA, MAD 2489, p. 74.

³⁵ The entry of *Tezkire* dated to 10 Ra. 1120/30 May 1708: BOA, MAD 2489, p. 75.

In July 15, 1708 Mehmed Aga was placed an order of two anchors with a weight of 60 kantar each, for the great galleon with three decks, at a price of 12 piasters per kantar as he had already consented to³⁶. He delivered 54 kantar and 32 lodra (3066,29 kg.) anchor on September 16, 1708. He had spent 92.376 akçe for the construction of this anchor. Thus, the anchor cost 1698 akçe (12 piasters 18 akçe) per kantar. This figure was certainly over than what he had formerly consented³⁷.

At the dockyard the construction of first large anchor (*lenger-i kebîr*) for three-decked great galleon (*üç ambarlı kebir kalyon*) was commissioned out to Mehmed Aga, the Chief Bombardier, together with Craftsman Ali, who was the chief ironsmith in the iron workshop of Imperial Naval Arsenal. This large anchor prepared by Craftsman Ali at the Iron workshop was 74,5 kantar and 10 lodra (4211,090 kg.) in weight and cost a sum of 125.480 akçe.

Therefore, craftsman Ali was warned that Mehmed Aga had stipulated 12 piasters per kantar of the anchor under the construction; thereby the anchor must have cost 107.420 akçe. Craftsman Ali, in return, responded that as the anchor was large, it was impossible to offer a price of 12 piasters per kantar and that the wages of the twenty six workers, who had been working for a course of 35 days, had not yet been paid off. As a consequence all the expenses he had made were upheld by the concerned state authorities³⁸.

Afterwards, anchors in the dockyard began to be ordered to Craftsman Ali, alongside with an expenditure chart for anchors he was to construct in iron workshop was prepared. That when an anchor with a weight of 35 kantar was completed, therein, a sum of 385 piasters of which 121 piasters was for the coal and wages, 264 piasters for the pig iron of 60 kantar, which was to be provided by the state from 12 akçe per kıyye,, and when an anchor with a weight of 45 kantar was completed, a sum of 540 piasters of which 276 piasters was for the coal and wages, 264 piasters for the pig iron of 60 kantar, which was to be provided also by the state from ratio of 12 akçe per kıyye, was to be given.

Craftsman Ali, who was noticed to be appointed by Mehmed Aga, the Chief Bombardier, for the construction of anchors, accepted the above mentioned conditions in front of the Superintendent and notables of Imperial Dockyard³⁹. He was informed that he could employ any ironsmiths of Galata whom he found useful. Craftsman Ali delivered, in the first month of 1121, the two anchors amounting to 90 kantar and 2 kıyye (5082,97 kg) which he

had constructed at iron workshop of Imperial Dockyard⁴⁰. Additionally, upon his petition, Craftsman Ali was allocated 50 piasters for the expense of a uniform (*kisve-i mükemmele*) that he was to wear during construction works⁴¹.

Table 2 - Anchors which Ali Usta constructed at Iron workshop of Imperial Dockyard between the years 1709 and 1713

Dates of Construction		Number	Anchors	
Hegira	Gregorian		Weight kantar	lodra
10 03 1121	20 05 1709	2	80	17
27 04 1121	06 07 1709	2	73	50
22 06 1121	29 08 1709	2	95	3
04 07 1121	09 09 1709	1	15	17
10 09 1121	13 11 1709	1	60	10
		1	41	
20 11 1121	21 01 1710	2	86	36
		2	88	10
18 12 1121	18 02 1710	1	40	11
17 01 1122	18 03 1710	1	34	
		1	37	85
		1	35	16
14 02 1122	14 04 1710	1	21	60
		1	20	60
		1	23	70
		1	25	80
25 05 1122	22 07 1710	1	25	12
18 06 1122	14 08 1710	1	27	43
18 07 1122	12 09 1710	1	27	96
13 08 1122	07 10 1710	1	29	10
27 09 1122	19 11 1710	2	54	5
		1	27	10
17 10 1122	09 12 1710	2	45	50
13 11 1122	03 01 1711	2	40	95
18 12 1122	07 02 1711	3	64	4
27 01 1123	17 03 1711	3	63	51
20 11 1123	30 12 1711	1	30	20
		1	29	51
10 09 1124	11 10 1712	2	70	60
26 10 1124	26 11 1712	2	59	
29 12 1124	27 01 1713	2	56	50

Source - BOA, MAD 2485, pp. 119, 125, 146, 151; MAD 3435, fol. 68b; MAD 2895, p. 112; MAD 2883, fol. 65b.

⁴⁰ The entry of Tezkire dated to 25 M. 1121/6 April 1709: BOA, MAD 2489, p. 81.

⁴¹ BOA, MAD 3435, fol. 66a.

³⁶ BOA, MAD 2489, p. 77 (26 R. 1120/15 July 1708).

³⁷ The entry of Tezkire dated to 2 B. 1120/17 September 1708: BOA, MAD 2489, p. 77.

³⁸ BOA, MAD 2489, p. 80 (8 L. 1120/21 December 1708).

³⁹ BOA, MAD 2489, p. 81 (7 Za. 1120/18 January 1709).

7. Conclusion

Ottoman took the superiority in the sea following the attempts to reorganise the fleet from 1701 and definitely restored the prestige they lost against Venice, in the sea battles at Morea. Charged in the very beginnings of the 18th century, Tolstoy, the first Russian permanent ambassador to Istanbul, drew his own observations in his report on the reorganisation of the Ottoman Navy. He notes that Imperial navy was being controlled by the officials with seafaring knowledge. Besides, the armament of the naval forces bulked large and new tactics in the naval manoeuvres were undertaken. It was no more a subject of fear to fight against the Christians in the sea thanks to the self-confidence which had reclaimed. They were vigorously spending all their effort to recapture Morea and constantly keeping the Mediterranean Sea under the close watch. The Turkish fleet ever demonstrated itself without any apprehension. However, during the previous battle, the rival Venetian armada did not even think to attack the Turkish fleet but it did prefer to stay on the defensive⁴².


Handwritten Ottoman Turkish text, likely a financial or administrative record, featuring several columns of numbers and descriptive phrases. The text is written in a cursive script and includes various numerical values and names, such as 'توسعه کوردی' and 'توسعه کوردی'.

The expense of the large anchor constructed by chief ironsmith Ali Usta in 1120/1708 for the three-decked great galleon (BOA, MAD 2489, p. 80).


⁴² П. А. Толстой, *Описание Черного моря, Эгейского Архипелага И Османского Флота*, [P. A. Tolstoy, *Opisanie Chernogo Morya, Egeyskogo Arhipelata i Osmanskogo Flota*], Moscow, 2006, pp. 231-232.

Handwritten Ottoman Turkish text, likely an account or ledger, organized into several sections with horizontal lines. The text includes various entries, some with dates in the Islamic calendar (e.g., 1131, 1132, 1133, 1134, 1135, 1136, 1137, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1144, 1145, 1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1155, 1156, 1157, 1158, 1159, 1160, 1161, 1162, 1163, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1167, 1168, 1169, 1170, 1171, 1172, 1173, 1174, 1175, 1176, 1177, 1178, 1179, 1180, 1181, 1182, 1183, 1184, 1185, 1186, 1187, 1188, 1189, 1190, 1191, 1192, 1193, 1194, 1195, 1196, 1197, 1198, 1199, 1200). The text is written in a cursive script and includes some numbers and possibly names of individuals or places. At the bottom, there is a larger block of text, possibly a summary or a signature, with some numbers like 218980, 218981, 218982, 218983, 218984, 218985, 218986, 218987, 218988, 218989, 218990, 218991, 218992, 218993, 218994, 218995, 218996, 218997, 218998, 218999, 219000.

Abstract of Account of the Cloth Mill for the year 1718-9 (BOA, MAD 10309, p. 156).



The galleon, Deli Balta [Ahmed Kaptan], in 1720 (Bostan, *Osmanlı Gemileri*, cit., p. 279, quotation from Surnâme, TSMK, A. 3593, fol. 93a).



The galleon, Şehbâz-ı Bahrî, in 1737 (Bostan, *Osmanlı Gemileri*, cit., p. 289 quotation from *Keyfiyet-i Rusya*, fol. 72a).

«Para los reales exércitos de Su Magestad». Il contributo della nobiltà sarda alle guerre della Monarchia ispanica (1626-1652)

Francesco Manconi*

Ad annunciare il coinvolgimento della Sardegna nella guerra dei Trent'anni è un pregone del viceré del dicembre 1625. Dopo la minaccia portata dalla flotta inglese a Cadice anche i sudditi sardi di Filippo IV d'Asburgo sono chiamati alla mobilitazione¹. Nel piano di distribuzione degli oneri militari fra i regni della Monarchia ispanica, predisposto dal conte-duca di Olivares nel quadro dell'*Unión de armas*, il ruolo assegnato all'isola è del tutto marginale: prevede un contributo non definito, compreso nel contingente di 6.000 soldati imposto alle isole del Mediterraneo e dell'Atlantico. Pare che la ripartizione dei contingenti di soldati sia stata concepita secondo un criterio di proporzionalità, che tiene conto della presunta consistenza demografica e non della capacità economica di ciascun dominio². È probabile perciò che il conte-duca facesse poco affidamento sull'apporto della Sardegna, considerata una terra spopolata e povera. Se per Maiorca si ipotizzava un contributo di 500 soldati per 5 anni³ è da presumere che, in proporzione, si prevedesse per la Sardegna un contingente non superiore al migliaio di uomini. Pertanto, niente a che vedere con i contributi richiesti

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¹ Arxiu de la Corona d'Aragó, Consell d'Aragó (ACA, CdA), leg. 1085, *Pregón en que se ordenaron y dispusieron muchos ordenes de guerra en conformidad de los avisos de la armada*, 9 dicembre 1625.

² J. H. Elliott – J. F. De La Peña, *Memoriales y cartas del Conde Duque de Olivares*, tomo I *Política interior: 1621 a 1627*, documento IX relativo all'*Unión de Armas*, Madrid, 1978, p. 180.

³ ACA, CdA, leg. 1140, *Proposición a los tres estamentos del reyno de Sardeña por don Lluís Blasco del Consejo del Rey nuestro Señor en el Supremo de Aragón, embiado por su Magestad al negocio que contiene* [Cagliari, 1626].